We are marching towards a EU Army

At the European Defense Agency’s (EDA) annual conference in November 2023, Ursula von der Leyen called for a European Defense Union. While the defense union is yet to materialise, the first-ever European Defense Industrial Strategy signed in March 2024 marked another significant step toward an EU Army by focusing on ramping up EU weapons manufacturing and creating an EU military – industrial complex, much to the advantage and cheered on by the EU armaments industries.

The EU’s collective military spending reached almost €300 billion in 2023, more than China’s official defense budget while public support in EU states for a common defense and security policy has remained above 70 percent . In contrast, the latest Irish Times poll showed that voters, when asked whether they supported the State’s current model of military neutrality or if they would like to see it change, 61 per cent said that they favoured the current model, while just more than a quarter (26 per cent) said they would like to see it change.

But the road to an EU Army has been a long and incremental one with its set-backs along the way. Historically, France’s 1951 proposal for a European Defense Community (EDC) among itself, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands sought to create a ‘pillar’ for NATO to collectively face the Soviet Union. Despite the subsequent rejection of the EDC by the French parliament, the Western European Union (WEU) military alliance was established in 1954 as an alternative. It included the UK and West Germany, paving way for the latter’s entry into NATO in 1955. 

France’s dissatisfaction with the dominance of British and American interests in NATO saw it reduce its participation and integration in NATO during the 1960s, later emphasising the WEU for greater European military integration. Nevertheless, in 1998, France and the historically eurosceptic Britain signed the Saint Malo declaration, committing to create a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and envisaging a still-unrealized 60,000 strong European force. The EU established that ESDP framework in 1999, and the WEU was transferred by the Maastricht Treaty to the EU, in 2000.

NATO-EU military cooperation and coordination increased with the 2001 NATO-EU Framework Agreement and 2003 Berlin Plus Agreement. The creation of NATO’s rapid reaction force in 2003 complicated the ambitions of the EU elites, while Eastern European states sought NATO assurances, not the EU’s. France, which rejoined NATO military command in 2009, was then provided significant U.S. assistance in its African military campaigns from 2014, including air-refuelling flights and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, aligning with broader U.S. priorities in Africa.

Washington’s long-term approach to the EU’s military autonomy suffered a significant disruption in 2016. The UK, traditionally the most skeptical of further EU military integration, voted to leave the EU, while Trump’s election victory and open disdain for NATO added uncertainty to the alliance. With fewer constraints, the EU elite accelerated their efforts to increase its autonomy. Days after the Brexit vote, the EU unveiled its 2016 European Global Strategy, outlining a path to a more independent military and foreign policy. In 2017, the European Defense Fund was established to secure collective defense funding, as well as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to develop joint military projects.

The Trump administration cautioned against PESCO excluding non-EU states, amid pressure from US arms manufacturers, concerned about being marginalised in the EU’s market. And after German Chancellor Angela Merkel endorsed Macron’s calls for a European army, Trump was highly critical of the decision.

The momentum of EU military integration continued into the Biden administration. The approval of the European Peace Facility (EPF) in early 2021 provided the EU with a collective mechanism to procure and supply lethal weapons systems to other countries, enhancing its ability to influence conflicts beyond its borders and supply weapons to compliant foreign states. And although the U.S. has reasserted its central role to the Western alliance in Ukraine, its recent funding setbacks have seen attempts by the EU to seize the initiative and hasten its path to military autonomy.

Having withdrawn from Africa in 2022 and 2023, France has intensified training programs, equipment transfers, and intelligence sharing and cooperation with Ukraine since the start of the conflict with Russia. In March 2024, President Emmanuel Macron stated that France has “no limits” on its aid to Ukraine, and would not rule out building a coalition to send troops to the country.

France’s status as the EU’s only nuclear power and permanent member of the United Nations Security Council affords it a distinctive position to drive EU military integration. Against the backdrop of Trump’s America First policies, Macron’s 2019 proposal for a bilateral strategic dialogue with Russia calls to create a new “European security architecture” broke from Washington. But concerns persist among other EU countries over perceptions that France is leveraging the EU to further its own ambitions. French weapons exports have surged to Ukraine, as well as to former Russian markets, and France has received more than a quarter of the European Defense Fund’s budget for pilot programs.

Meanwhile, in 2016, two Dutch combat brigades were integrated into German divisions, as well as some integration between their naval forces. The Czech Republic and Romania have also integrated a brigade each into the German armed forces in 2017, while all three Dutch brigades were integrated in 2023. But Germany currently appears unwilling to go further, despite being the only one capable of matching France’s initiatives.

In a move that impedes the EU’s efforts for unified military integration, Poland and Britain signed the 2030 Strategic Partnership in 2023 to strengthen their foreign policy, security, and defense cooperation. Later that year, the defense ministers of Japan, Italy, and the UK signed an agreement to form a collaborative organisation to develop an advanced fighter jet, providing London with another entry point into the European defense market. In early 2024, UK forces also led the NATO Rapid Response Forces exercises in Poland and military contacts with the EU have been restored.

The array of EU institutions, which also include the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), Capability Development Plan (CDP), European Defense Agency (EDA), and the EU’s Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDITB) among many others, highlights the growing bureaucracy tasked with coordinating multiple states on military affairs. The EDA oversees 178 major weapons systems alone. The implementation of PESCO meanwhile suffered delays while the creation of a Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) of 5,000 soldiers by 2025 forges ahead.

Add to this the military arrangements among European countries; the Baltic Defense Cooperation, Nordic Defense Cooperation, and Lancaster House Treaty, Joint Expeditionary Force and European Intervention Initiative, with many still including the British. Also, the recent decisions by Finland and Sweden to join NATO, the EU’s deep involvement in the conflict in Ukraine and a bellicose von der Leyen have served to strengthen the alignment of the EU and NATO.

The EU is currently engaged in 10 military initiatives across three continents and has also participated in anti-piracy operations. In early 2024, the EU chose to launch its own naval mission to combat Houthi militant attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, rather than operate under U.S. command.

While the EU’s defense infrastructure still relies on U.S. assistance and is suffers from fragmentation, but it possesses more than just the foundational elements needed for an EU Army. Despite the protracted and incremental nature of this journey, the EU’s consistent and recently accelerated advances towards this goal, presages a Defence Union in the not very distant future, necessitating a hard fought referendum in Ireland.